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rakoczy and Tomasello follow Searle in claiming that rule games need status function 
assignment and constitutive rules. But, in the case of pretend play, it is not easy to put 
together these notions with the natural world knowledge necessary to engage in it. if we 
consider the pretended scenario as a possible world, metaphysically possible, then, how 
can we abandon the natural necessity implicit in it? The rules of pretend-inference can 
have a robustly objective status. On this view pretence stands to pretending as truth 
stands to belief. 
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gelman and Byrnes told us, in chomsky’s terms, that “[w]e can determine 
how languages and conceptual systems are constrained by examining the 
forms and meanings that children construct, and which errors they fail 
to make” (gelman and Byrnes 1991, 3). thus Billman suggested that we 
should compare and test psychological models of structure and processing 
of concepts by examining the function from “learning instances plus the 
target items to categorize” to “the set of possible category judgments” 
(Billman 1992, 415). then the actual extension of the category is taken to 
be determined by how the learner is inclined to classify new examples. But 
i believe that experiments need to be designed and interpreted with it in 
mind that the cognitive systems are designed by evolution and tuned by 
experience to find real-world substances, not random logically possible 
ones. i think pretence is a special case of conceptual tracking. Pretending is 
changing the nature of perceptual inputs at will. i suggest the exercise of 
this kind of agency can enable subject to experience the “refractoriness” 
of reality, experience the constraints that the reality sets on what they 
can experience. 
according to hannes rakoczy and michael tomasello the ontogeny 
of social ontology starts with pretend play. this is the voluntary 
transformation of the here and now, the you and me, and the this or that, 
along with any potential action that these components of a situation might 
have. thus, pretence presents a cradle for children’s development into 
institutional life, but, in order not to be confused by a parent’s pretend 
acts, the child must interpret pretence events as what they stand for. 
according to rakoczy and tomasello (r&t) this is so because on embryonic 
form these phenomena exhibit the logical structure of the conventional 
creation of institutional facts. Following searle, they recognize that, in 
contrast to brute facts “out there”, institutional facts hold only by virtue 
of a social, conventional practice and have the logical form “x counts 
as y in a contest c”. every stipulations of the pretence scenario involve a 
status function assignment. so children do not get confused about reality 
because of the symbolic nature of status function. Quoting searle “the 
sense in which symbolization in [a] broad linguistic sense is essential to all 
institutional facts is that the move from x to y in the formula ‘x counts as y 
in c’ is already a symbolic move” (searle 1999, 155). 
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i agree with r&t that pretence, if it is an institutional fact or not, involve 
normative aspects, that is, what is appropriate, what is a mistake, or highly 
inappropriate, in a given context. For example, rakoczy has shown that 
children from around 2 years old not only are proficient at acting according 
to jointly set-up fictional stipulations in the context of shared pretend 
play, but when a third party confused pretence identities and thus made 
mistakes, children leveled protest and critique (see rakoczy 2008). But we 
don’t have a conclusive evidence that early pretence involves the symbolic 
function. some evidence stems from old studies showing correlations 
between early acquisition of words—symbols for referents— and use of 
pretence gestures (e.g., Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, camaioni,  and Volterra 
1979). on the contrary, in a recent research, angeline lillard claims that 
young children’s understanding of pretence is heavily guided by their ability 
to read gestures out of context, perhaps only in the face of supportive social 
signals indicating pretence rather than by employing a symbolic function 
(lillard 2001). i don’t think that symbolic function is always a necessary 
condition for an institutional fact. in fact, we can give an independent 
account of normativity and not-contradiction in pretence, without the 
symbolic function. 
if pretending is a case of “thinking of x as y”, y is the way x is described, but, 
if we follow roger scruton’s account of imagination, broadly conceived, 
then pretence involves thinking of these descriptions as appropriate in some 
way to the primary object (see scruton 1974). Pretending may be compared 
with uttering a sentence, as distinct from asserting it. We know that not 
everything that is said is also asserted. i may practice my pronunciation and 
simply utter a sentence, so i represent a state of affairs, but i don’t thereby 
assert that the state of affairs is real. i merely represent a possibility without 
asserting it, and we know, as empirical evidence tells us, that children don’t 
believe what they pretend. nor do i hesitantly assert what the sentence 
says. Pretending cannot be analyzed in terms of belief. the content of my 
belief can be expressed by a sentence, in this case sentences are being used 
to say something. in a secondary case, as in elocution, sentences are being 
treated more as patterns of sound than as verbal symbols. if pretending 
is a case of “thinking of x as y”, then to think of x as y at least involves the 
entertaining of the proposition “x is y”. so, if someone pretends that a 
banana is a telephone, then he has a disposition to say “i think of the banana 
as a telephone”. But, it is not sufficient for the truth of his pronouncement 
that he should have a disposition to entertain this proposition if he always 
immediately rejects it as false. actually, i may think of x as y while knowing 
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that it is untrue. on the other hand, with symbols we are limited to the 
dimension of falsity. By definition it’s always false that x is y if the first is 
a symbol for the second. and, clearly, marking the pretend representation 
as false does not even begin to capture the semantics of early pretence. in 
a “mark as false” account a child infers that “mummy pretends that (this 
banana is a telephone)false’. then she gives him the banana and says “the 
telephone is ringing”. the child represents this as “mummy pretends that 
(the telephone is ringing)false”. But, which telephone? this problem does not 
arise if we merely entertain the proposition “x is y”. the failure of reference 
in the speech-act is a consequence of my entertaining unasserted the 
existential proposition whose truth is a necessary condition for the truth of 
“this banana is a telephone”. of course, we know that the pretence scenario 
is not true, but, on the other hand, there are precise true-conditions to 
decide if pretending P is a case of pretence. in my opinion, to say that P is 
pretence is to make a normative rather than a descriptive claim, and children 
are sensitive to what is pretence. in this way i reject the contrary view that 
a child can understand what is pretence only by understanding that someone 
is pretending something. Pretence, i think, is a rational activity, then, what 
is to judge an unasserted description to be appropriate to a certain object? 
Pretending is a way of going beyond the “given”, the primary object, and 
producing descriptions which one is unprepared to assert. But this is not 
sufficient. It is necessary that the description be entertained because of his 
appropriateness.
it is true that pretence does involve treating objects as if they were 
something else, and r&t quote searle “in the limiting case, we can use the 
object itself to represent the y status function” (searle 1999, 155), but this 
cognitive activity is more sophisticated. For example, following alan leslie 
(1987) we can recognize three basic forms of pretence, with their semantic 
properties:
1. object substitution (referential opacity) 
2. attribution of pretend properties (nonentailment of truth-
falsehood)
3. imaginary object pretence (nonentailment of existence)
it has been argued that pretending 2-year-olds understand four features of 
pretense: pretend stipulations, causal powers, the suspension of objective 
truth, and an unfolding causal chain. the current situation might contain 
a toy horse or an empty cup. then, for example, memory systems are 
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addressed, returning information on entities that are perceptually similar 
(e.g., on horses) or on the functional properties of the object (e.g., on 
containing). this leads to pretence based on perceptual similarity or on 
functional connection. 
markman and abelev (2006) suggest that pretence is not unique in 
permitting 2 and 3-year-olds to recognize multiple object identities. in 
their study children were as good at recognizing unusual functional use as 
they were pretence, while still failing the appearance-reality task where 
deceptive stimuli were used across tasks. their interpretation is that 
children understand multiple object identities better when an object’s 
intrinsic identity is contrasted with its relational role, that is an extrinsic 
object properties. so, children are able to distinguish extrinsic object 
properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better 
than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones 
(appearance vs. category-membership).
if we follow this account, then, conceptual factors, such as the intrinsic 
or extrinsic nature of the alternative identity, help shape children’s 
performance on multiple object identity tasks. 
now we can try to answer the question scruton posed about appropriateness 
of descriptions.
We have two options:
(i) Keil-leslie: anchoring is straightforward for immediate pretense; it 
proceeds by means of a best formal match between expressions in the 
pretend and current perceptual representations
(ii) searle: the status and its accompanying function go beyond the 
sheer brute physical functions that can be assigned to physical objects  
so, we stay between scylla of highly structured scenario and charybdis of 
an umbrella-term that covers many different phenomena. We need to define 
our domain of search a bit more precisely. 
in these situations we are working on the identity of x and y, and, my claim 
is, if we consider the new scenario as a possible world, metaphysically 
possible, then, how can we abandon the natural necessity implicit both 
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in the stipulation and in successive possible implications1? children’s 
understanding of the causal consequences of a pretend action is a routine 
by-product of a simple processing rule: to understand the consequences of 
a pretend action, assume that the entities or substances whose existence 
is stipulated are subject to the same causal principles as their real-world 
equivalents (see Paul harris 2000; alison gopnik 2009). normativity is 
constitutive of the scenario, but it is strongly appreciated in its possible 
consequences. this shows that children need to draw on familiar, real world 
causal principles. this evidence is not compatible with the way searle uses 
the notion of observer-dependent fact. according to searle the symbolic nature 
of a similar fact is not a product of physical virtues. moreover, if we follow 
r&t in claiming that pretence is probably the ontogenetically primary factor 
for institutional life, then, should we adopt such a conclusion as: pretence 
is “a matter of status functions imposed according to constitutive rules”? 
(searle 2005, 9) But, which constitutive rules? even r&t recognize that in 
this case “the “y”, is not, as in the case of rule games, only understandable 
through the game” (rakoczy and tomasello 2007, 19).
We can try to find a third position between our two: 
if we follow Paul harris (2000) we have two hypothesis about the relation 
between reality and pretence2:
a. in the case of pretend play, children do not set up a contrast between an 
imaginary event and an actual event
b. Pretend events are not set up as departures from actual events
We have a good reason to agree with him about the first hypothesis and a 
plausible hypothesis to reject the second.
Contrast first. Why there is not real contrast? A generic notion of symbol doesn’t 
help, but i think we can recognize that in our examples of pretence there is 
something that can be called iconic. according to Peirce a sign is an icon when it 
“may represent its objects mainly by its similarity” (Peirce 1931-1958, 2.276).
1 i follow Kit Fine in arguing that thinking about identity is a necessary condition to talk about 
metaphysical modalities, and this cannot reject physical notions. rather than to give up the idea that 
there are any natural necessities, thinking about identity,  
i believe, should lead us to adopt a more discriminating view as to which natural necessities are 
metaphysical contingent.
2 In her review, Tamar Gendler defines Harris’ work “an extraordinarily comprehensive and 
informative book surveying a tremendous range of empirical psychological work on imagination 
in children” (2002, 414). gopnik (2009, ch. 1) is even more generous with harris’ work.
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the iconic device may possess certain elementary iconic markers and 
sometimes a minimal resemblance is due to the fact that the iconic sign, 
even though different in shape from its object, performs the same function. 
We can think just a stick which qualifies as a horse because one can proudly 
ride it. the only aspect that the stick has in common with a real horse is 
that it can be straddled. hence the child has rendered emergent one of the 
functions permitted by the horse. now, contrary to what is sometimes said, 
communication need not come into this process at all3. he may not have 
wanted to show his horse to anyone. it just served as a focus for his fantasies 
as he galloped along.
But our stick can become the icon of a horse, a sceptre, or a sword. in all 
these objects recurs the same element, that is the feature of linearity 
(vertical or horizontal). But we haven’t a case of imitation. insofar as 
the vertical quality is a feature of both a stick and a sword it is the same 
verticality. then, a linear dimension has been used as an expressive feature 
in order to substitute for the linear dimension that equally characterizes 
a horse as such. or, in other words, a part of the referent is used as a sign-
vehicle. We can quote Kant. In the first Kritik space, like time, is a pure 
intuition, the elementary form that we confer upon experiential data so as 
to be able to perceive them and place them within the categories. therefore, 
verticality and horizontality are the intuitive mode within which we frame 
our perceptions, not intellectual abstractions. the spatial dimensions are 
not an intellectual construction, but the structural conditions for a possible 
object, and as conditions they may be reproduced, equal to themselves, in 
varied circumstances. Whereas geometrical figures are already objects built 
under the framework of such conditions, and they cannot be reproduced 
as equal to themselves, but only as abstractions similar to previous 
constructions. this doesn’t stop the stick from standing for the horse, 
but this happens because the linearity of the stick is not a construct but a 
condition of every other possible construction, and thus an intuitive artifice 
able to determine a space. We can concede that a toy horse or a stick is a 
sign, but we need to better distinguish the imitans from the imitatum, that 
which stands for something from that for which something else stands. 
so, according to this analysis, iconism makes no appearance, and, as they 
say in semiotics, we have only intrinsically coded acts. so, to try to better 
understand the nature of pretence we are allowed to put aside symbolism.
3 here i agree with ernest gombrich (1951). it seems that searle’s insistence on the inescapable 
role of language goes beyond what is justified by the facts. Early pretence is just an example of this 
problem.
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We can consider the second argument: a possible hypothesis about possible 
departures from reality. 
episodic memory involves re-experiencing situations. Kant argued that 
for the experience of objects (inner or outer) to be possible at all space 
and time must precede and structure all experiences of outer and inner 
states. our experience must be grounded in space and time as pure “forms 
on intuition”. if experience has a spatial content and if episodic memory 
is re-experiencing then episodic traces must have spatial content. the 
claim is that for there to be episodic memory in any creature, what 
makes it an experience is something non-conceptual. according to robert 
hanna “the thesis of non-Conceptualism about mental content says that 
representational content is neither solely nor wholly determined by our 
conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both wholly 
and solely determined by non-conceptual capacities and can be shared by 
human and non-human animals alike” (hanna 2008, 42). Kant developed 
in the Transcendental aesthetic the idea that space and time are a priori 
subjective forms of sensibility. however, sensibility was supposed to include 
not only sense perception but also the “inner sense” imagination, pleasure, 
pain, desire. infact, we should think of the representation of space and 
the representation of time as the necessary a priori subjective forms of 
egocentrically centered human and non-human animal embodiment. 
Following these premises we claim that memorial re-experiencing is a form 
of inner sense, akin to the imagination. in the case of pretence i think that 
the non-conceptual image might be identified with what we have seen as a 
minimum image that is still sufficient to release a specific reaction. 
imagining intends absent objects; perceiving intends present objects. same 
objects, different intentional relation. so, is it possible to see something 
and, in the same time, to image something else that negates it? here 
with “to image” i simply mean an episode of imagery, a mental image. or, 
starting from a more basic question, is it possible to see and to image the 
same thing? For example, while we are looking at our mother we can try 
to visualize her face, and we need the same content in the very same way. 
But this exercise is not easy at all. it is known that there is overlap in the 
regions of the brain that are activated in seeing and visualizing. according 
to Kosslyn the same cerebral mechanism in our neuroanatomy must be 
involved, the Visual Buffer. in Zettel, Wittgenstein says “while i am looking 
at an object i cannot imagine it” (§621). this means that i cannot imagine 
the very object i am looking at. i can surely be looking at my mother from 
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the back, not even realize i am looking at my mother, and still imagine 
her from the front. de re seeing does not prevent de dicto imagining. so our 
minimum image is projected into the real situation and it helps to imagine 
alternative metaphysically possible situations, that is real departures. i 
suggest that the child who pretends productively is tracking the world. he 
is responding to the world in something like the way one responds to the 
world with one’s beliefs. rules of pretend-inference have a robustly objective 
status, as demonstrated by greg currie (1998). on this view pretence stands to 
pretending as truth stands to beliefs. 
Does ontoGenesis of soCial ontoloGy staRt With PRetenCe?
gaetano alBergo università degli Studi di Catania
159
REFERENCES
abelev, m. and markman e. (2006), “young children’s understanding of 
multiple object identity: appearance, Pretense and Function”, developmental 
Science, 9(6), 2006, pp. 590-596;
Bates, e., Benigni, l., Bretherton, i., camaioni, l., and Volterra, V. 
(1979), “cognition and communication from nine to thirteen months: 
correlational Findings”, in e. Bates (ed.), The emergence of Symbols: Cognition 
and Communication in infancy,  academic Press, new york, 1979;
Billman, d. (1992), “modeling category learning and use”, in Burns B. 
(ed.), Percepts, Concepts, and Categories. The representation and Processing of 
information, north-holland, amsterdam, 1002;
currie, g. (1998), “Pretence, Pretending and metarepresenting”, mind and 
language, 13, 1998, pp. 35-55;
gelman, s.a. and Byrnes, J.P. (eds.) (1991), Perspectives on language and 
thought, cuP, cambridge, 1991;
gendler szabó, t. (2002), “review”, mind, Vol. 111, no. 442, 2002, pp. 414-418;
gombrich, e. (1951), “meditations on a hobby horse”, in meditations on a hobby 
horse and Other essays on the Theory of art, (1963), Phaidon, london, 1951;
gopnik, a. (2009), The Philosophical Baby, Farrar, straus and giroux, 2009;
hanna, r. (2008), “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, 137, 
2008, pp. 41–64;
harris, P. (2000), the Work of the imagination, Wiley-Blackwell, oxford, 2000;
Kosslyn, s.m. (1994), image and Brain: The resolution of the imagery debate. mit 
Press, cambridge, ma, 1994;
leslie, a.m. (1987), “Pretense and representation: the origins of ‘theory of 
mind’”, Psychological review, 94, 1987, pp. 412–426;
lillard, a. (2001), “Pretend Play as twin earth: a social-cognitive analysis”, 
developmental review, 21, 2001, pp. 495–531;
Peirce, c.s. (1931-1958), Collected Papers, harvard university Press, cambridge;
rackoczy, h. (2008), “taking Fiction seriously: young children understand 
the normative structure of Joint Pretence games”, developmental Psychology,  
2008, p. 44;
rackoczy, h. and tomasello m. (2007), “the ontogeny of social ontology”, 
in s.l. tsohatzidis (ed.), intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John 
Searle’s Social Ontology, springer Verlag, Berlin, 2007;
scruton, r. (1974), art and imagination, methuen, london, 1974;
searle, J.r. (1999), mind, language, and Society. Philosophy in the real World, 
Weidenfeld and nicholson, london, 1999;
searle, J.r. (2005), “What is an institution”, Journal of institutional economics, 
1(1), 2005, pp. 1–22;
Does ontoGenesis of soCial ontoloGy staRt With PRetenCe?
gaetano alBergo università degli Studi di Catania
160
searle, J.r. (2010), making the Social World, ouP, oxford, 2010;
Wittgenstein, l. (1981), Zettel, (2nd. ed.), g.e.m. anscombe and g.h.V. Wright 
(eds.), Blackwell, oxford, 1981.
Does ontoGenesis of soCial ontoloGy staRt With PRetenCe?
gaetano alBergo università degli Studi di Catania
